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Double Jeopardy Limitations on Appeals
by the Government in Criminal Cases
I. Introduction
In 1970 Congress amended the Criminal Appeals Act1 to extend
federal government appeal rights in criminal cases to the limits im-
posed by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.2 The
Supreme Court began definition of those limits during its 1974-75
term through three decisions commonly referred to as the double
jeopardy trilogy:3 United States v. Wilson,4 United States v. Jenkins,
5
and Serfass v. United States.6 To grasp the importance of the three
cases fully, it must be recalled that the Supreme Court ruled in
Benton v. Maryland' that the double jeopardy clause applies to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the constitutional
protection afforded a criminal defendant against an appeal by state
authorities is identical to that guaranteed a defendant in a federal
prosecution." Wilson, Jenkins, and Serfass subjected the double
jeopardy limitations on government appeal rights to the most intense
scrutiny they have ever received from the Court. This comment will
review the law in light of the double jeopardy trilogy and evaluate the
policies advanced by those cases.
II. Background
A. History of the Criminal Appeals Act
It was not until Congress enacted the Criminal Appeals Act9 in
1907 that the federal government acquired any appeal rights in
criminal cases. The Supreme Court had ruled in 1892 that the
United States could not appeal an adverse decision without express
1. Omnibus Crime Control Act, Act of Jan. 2, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-644, tit.
III, § 14(a), 84 Stat. 1890, amending 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1970)).
2. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. E.g., United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 80 (5th Cir. 1975).
4. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
5. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
6. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
7. 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969).
8. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 12 (1964).
9. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.
statutory authorization. 10 Thereafter, Attorneys General complained
of district judges' power "to defeat any criminal prosecution instituted
by the Government" by merely quashing the indictment"' and
urged Congress to provide the necessary authorization.' 2 No con-
gressional action was forthcoming, however, until President Theo-
dore Roosevelt angrily demanded enabling legislation in his 1906
message to Congress."8 Roosevelt had been spurred to action by an
unreviewable district court decision that prevented prosecution of the
"Beef Trust."' 4  The President's words motivated Congress to enact
the Criminal Appeals Act. '"
The Act conferred jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to
consider writs of error by the federal government in three situations. 6
Although the constitutional problems presented by the Act were
minor and later were avoided by judicial interpretation, 17 other prob-
lems were not so easily averted. As Justice Marshall noted in Wilson,
the Act "was construed in accordance with the common-law meaning
of the terms employed, and the rules governing the conditions of
appeal became highly technical."' 8  These technicalities continued to
plague the courts through several amendments.' 9 Problems arose not
10. [U]nder the common law, as generally understood and administered
in the United States, and in the absence of any statute expressly giving the
right to the State, a writ of error cannot be sued out in a criminal case after
a final judgment in favor of the defendant . . . . [he defendant . . .
is not to be again vexed for the same cause, unless the legislature, acting
within its constitutional authority, has made express provision for a review
of the judgment at the instance of the government.
United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 318 (1892).
The bar against appeal appears to be based upon a common-law protection
against double jeopardy, "a rule of such vital importance to the security of the citizen
that it cannot be impaired but by express words [in a statute]." Id. at 313, quoting
State v. Reynolds, 4 Hay. 110 (Tenn. 1817).
11. 1892 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. xxiv.
12. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 293 & n.23 (1970).
13. 41 CONG. REC. 22 (1906).
14. United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1906). "Nothing
seemed to enrage . . . Roosevelt more than to have his programs thwarted by the
processes of the law." Kurland, The Mersky Case and the Criminal Appeals Act,
28 U. CHI. L. REV. 419, 449 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Kurland].
15. A detailed discussion of the passage of the Criminal Appeals Act appears
in Kurland, supra note 14, at 446-55.
16. The Act permitted the government to appeal from a decision arresting judg-
ment for insufficiency of the indictment or dismissing the indictment when the arrest
or dismissal was "based upon the invalidity, or construction of the statute upon which
the indictment is founded." Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246. An ap-
peal was also permitted from a decision sustaining a special plea in bar if the defend-
ant had not yet been put in jeopardy. Id.
17. Comment, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of Criminal Dismis-
sals, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 303, 310 n.36 (1974).
18. 420 U.S. at 337.
19. Act of January 31, 1928, ch. 14, § 2, 45 Stat. 54 (substituted the right of
appeal for review by writ of error); Act of May 9, 1942, ch. 295, § 1, 56 Stat. 271
(provided that some dismissals could be reviewed in the circuit courts of appeal and
extended the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to include prosecutions by informa-
tion); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, tit. XVIII, § 3731, 62 Stat. 844 (amended the
Act to conform with rule 12 of the FED. R. CRIM. P.); Act of June 19, 1968, Pub.
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only in determining whether an appeal was authorized in a particular
situation, but also in deciding whether the court of appeals or the
Supreme Court was the proper appellate tribunal.20  The best de-
scription of the Act was set forth by the late Justice Harlan in United
States v. Sisson.2 He labeled it "a failure" and a "most unruly child
that has not improved with age"22 and in resignation declared,
"[U]ntil such time as Congress decides to amend the statute, this
Court must abide by. .. this awkward and ancient Act. 28
Revision of the Criminal Appeals Act in 197024 was intended to
broaden government appeal rights in criminal cases 25 and to channel
all such appeals to the circuit courts.26  Another goal was elimination
of the confusing common-law terminology.27  Each objective was
attained and the Act currently reads as follows:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie
to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a
district court dismissing an indictment or information as to any
one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where -the
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohib-
its further prosecution.
The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed
to effectuate its purposes. 28
The Court's construction of the amended Criminal Appeals Act
appears in Wilson: "While the language of the new Act is not
dispositive, the legislative history makes it clear that Congress intend-
ed to remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and to
allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit."29
L. No. 90-351, tit. VIII, § 1301, 82 Stat. 237 (authorized appeal from pretrial rulings
granting motions to suppress or return seized property).
20. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 308 (1970).
21. 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
22. Id. at 307.
23. Id. at 308.
24. Omnibus Crime Control Act, Act of Jan. 2, 1971, Pub. L No. 91-644, tit.
III, § 14(a), 84 Stat. 1890, amending 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1970)).
25. S. REP. No. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970).
26. Chief Justice Burger noted in Serfass that appellate review, when jurisdic-
tion lay with the Supreme Court, had been further limited by decisions of the Depart-
ment of Justice to not appeal when the question involved was deemed of insufficient
importance to merit attention of the Supreme Court. 420 U.S. at 386.
27. S. REp. No. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1970).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970).
29. 420 U.S. at 337. Chief Justice Burger explicitly reached this same conclu-
sion in Serfass. 420 U.S. at 387. Justice Rehnquist, in Jenkins, assumed this to be
the intended construction. 420 U.S. at 366. The courts of appeals, looking to the
B. The Double Jeopardy Clause
Freed from the common-law technicalities of the first Criminal
Appeals Act, federal courts now must direct their attention to consti-
tutional limitations on government appeal rights. 30 These limitations
are embodied in the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment:
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . 1 Judge Friendly of the
Second Circuit has found this language "unilluminating. '' 32  Its
vagueness is accentuated by the scarcity of precedent dealing with
double jeopardy limitations on government appeal rights.33 Prior to
the 1970 amendment of the Criminal Appeals Act, the right of the
federal government to appeal in a criminal case was either nonexist-
ent3" or severely limited. Appellate consideration naturally was lack-
ing.36 Furthermore, most cases that considered government appeal
rights were devoted to construing provisions of the former Criminal
Appeals Act. 36 Rarely were constitutional limitations an important
consideration. The four Supreme Court decisions usually cited for
controlling precedent are United States v. Ball,3 7 Kepner v. United
legislative history of the amending act, had generally arrived at this same construc-
tion in their decisions preceding the double jeopardy trilogy. Serfass v. United States,
420 U.S. 377, 387 & n.l1 (1975).
The legislative history is composed of H.R. REP. No. 1768, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
116 CONG. REC. 42036, 42042 (1970) (conference report); S. REP. No. 1296, 91st
Cong. 2d Sess. (1970); 116 CONG. REc. 35658-60 (1970); S. 3132, 91st Cong. 1st
Sess. (1969). A detailed discussion of the legislative history is provided by United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337-39 (1975).
30. Referring to changes the House-Senate conference committee had made in
the act proposed by the Senate, 116 CONG. REC. 42036, 42042 (1970), Justice
Marshall declared in Wilson,
These changes are consistent with the Senate Committee's desire to author-
ize appeals whenever constitutionally permissible, but they suggest that Con-
gress decided to rely on the courts to define the constitutional boundaries
rather than to create a statutory scheme that might be in some respects nar-
rower or broader than the Fifth Amendment would allow.
420 U.S. at 338-39.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
32. United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 870 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S.
358 (1975). Judge Friendly's opinion contains a thorough historical analysis of the
policies underlying the principle of double jeopardy.
33. "[T]his Court has had relatively few occasions to comment directly on the
constitutional restrictions on Government appeals." United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332, 345 (1975).
34. Prior to passage of the Criminal Appeals Act in 1907, Act of March 2,
1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246, the federal government had no right of appeal in crim-
inal cases.
35. See notes 9-16 and accompanying text and note 26 supra.
36. "The statutory restrictions on Government appeals long made it unneces-
sary for this Court to consider the constitutional limitations on the appeal rights of
the prosecution except in unusual circumstances." United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332, 339 (1975).
37. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). Three defendants were tried for murder. Two were
convicted, but the third, Millard Fillmore Ball, was acquitted by the jury. On appeal,
the original indictment was found to be defective, and the two convictions were re-
versed. All three defendants were reindicted and convicted. Ball successfully at-
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States,38 Fong Foo v. United States,39 and United States v. Sisson.40
These cases, however, lacked the reasoning and in-depth analysis
tacked his conviction on double jeopardy grounds. The Supreme Court ruled that an
acquittal, even on a defective indictment, would bar a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense.
38. 195 U.S. 100 (1904). This case arose in the Philippine Islands. The Act
of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, § 5, 84 Stat. 691, applied to the Philippines a double jeop-
ardy clause similar to the one in the United States Constitution. Kepner, charged
with embezzlement, was acquitted in a bench trial. The prosecution appealed to the
Supreme Court of the Philippines. After an independent review of the record, that
court found Kepner guilty. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding
that "to try a man after a verdict of acquittal is to put him twice in jeopardy, al-
though the verdict was not followed by judgment." 195 U.S. at 133. The key factor
was that the proceedings in the Philippine Supreme Court were in essence a trial de
novo. Thus, permitting the appeal would have exposed Kepner to a second trial.
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 346 (1975).
Justice Holmes was concerned with the case's effect on the United States crim-
inal justice system:
The case is of great importance, not only in its immediate bearing upon the
administration of justice in the Philippines, but, since the words used in the
act of Congress are also in the Constitution, even more because the decision
will necessarily carry with it an interpretation of the latter instrument.
195 U.S. at 134. In dissent, Justice Holmes argued that "[a]t the present time in
this country there is more danger that criminals will escape justice than that they will
be subjected to tyranny." Id.
39. 369 U.S. 141 (1962). A corporation and two of its employees were
charged with conspiracy and concealing material facts from a federal agency. Dur-
ing the testimony of the fourth government witness, the trial judge directed the jury
to return verdicts of acquittal for all the defendants. Although the acquittal may
have been "egregiously erroneous," the Supreme Court concluded "that the [protec-
tion from double jeopardy] was violated when the Court of Appeals set aside the
judgment of acquittal and directed that [the defendants] be tried again for the same
offense." Id. at 143.
40. 399 U.S. 267 (1970). This case arose under the Criminal Appeals Act be-
fore it was amended in 1970. Sisson was indicted for refusing to submit to induction
into the armed forces and found guilty by a jury. The trial judge subsequently en-
tered what he termed an arrest of judgment and dismissed the indictment. The judge
believed that Sisson could not be convicted because his sincere opposition to the war
in Vietnam outweighed the need to draft him. The Supreme Court ruled that an ap-
peal by the government was not authorized under either the arresting judgment or
the motion in bar provisions of the Criminal Appeals Act. See note 16 supra. The
Court's opinion offered three reasons for its conclusion that the district court's order
was not an arrest of judgment. Discussion of the third reason included language indi-
cating that the double jeopardy clause would also bar an appeal. This language often
has been interpreted to be an alternative holding in Sisson. See note 136 and accom-
panying text infra. But in the trilogy, the Court denied the existence of such an al-
ternative holding:
A more natural reading of this passage suggests that the reference to
the Double Jeopardy Clause was meant to apply to the hypothetical
[discussed in the same portion of the opinion], not to the order entered by
the trial court in Sisson itself . . . . Accordingly, we find Sisson no au-
thority for the proposition that the Government cannot constitutionally ap-
peal any post-verdict order that would have been an unappealable acquittal
under the former Criminal Appeals Act.
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1975) (footnotes omitted); accord,
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 392 (1975). Hopefully, the widespread con-
fusion engendered by Sisson in the courts of appeals will disappear now.
necessary to establish guidelines for future decisions.41 As a result
the Supreme Court had a relatively clean slate on which to write its
double jeopardy trilogy.
The trilogy decisions were the first Supreme Court cases that
considered the 1970 version of the Criminal Appeals Act and the
resultant expansion of government appeal rights to their constitu-
tional limits. 42 In outlining the Court's approach, Justice Marshall de-
clared, "[I]t is necessary to take a closer look at the policies under-
lying the [Double Jeopardy] Clause in order to determine more
precisely the boundaries of the Government's appeal rights in crim-
inal cases."43 This closer look included tracing its "historical back-
ground, the proceedings leading to its adoption as part of the Fifth
Amendment, and the course of decisions thereunder. '44  The princi-
ple of double jeopardy has been traced to the Greeks and Romans45
and in England it was established as early as the thirteenth century.46
Coke47 and Blackstone 4s both recognized the principle in their
41. Not only is discussion of the constitutional question brief in each of the
four cases, United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975), the opinions also
overly relied on the label given to the disposition of the case in the trial court and
not enough on the policies underlying the double jeopardy clause. See notes 103-04
and accompanying text infra.
42. The effective date of the 1970 amendments to the Criminal Appeals Act
was January 2, 1971. The amended Act only applied to prosecutions begun after that
date. Omnibus Crime Control Act, Act of Jan. 2, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-644, tit. III,
§ 14(a), 84 Stat. 1890, amending 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1970)).
43. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975) (emphasis added).
44. United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 870 (2d Cir. 1973), afj'd, 420 U.S.
358 (1975). An excellent, detailed analysis of the historical background and course of
decisions under the fifth amendment is contained in Judge Friendly's opinion in Jen-
kins. Id. at 870-78. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339-51 (1975); Com-
ment, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of Criminal Dismissals, 52 TEXAS
L. REV. 303, 305-08 (1974). An extensive, historical review of the principles underly-
ing protection from double jeopardy appears in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-
54 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
45. E.g., Digest of Justinian: DIGEST 48.2.7.2, translated in 11 ScoTT, THE
CIVIL LAW 17 (1932), as "[tihe governor should not permit the same person to be
again accused of crime of which he has been acquitted," cited in Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121, 152 n.3 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). "Fear and abhorrence of gov-
ernmental power to try people twice for the same conduct is one of the oldest ideas
found in western civilization." Id. at 151.
46. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
"Even in the Dark Ages, when so many other principles of justice were lost, the idea
that one trial and one punishment were enough remained alive through the canon law
and the teachings of the early Christian writers." Id.; see 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 391 (Thorne trans. 1968) (applying the concept
of double jeopardy to acquittals in trial by battle), cited in United States v. Jenkins,
490 F.2d 868, 871 (2d Cir. 1973), afi'd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
47. Lord Coke, writing in the seventeenth century, described the protection
from double jeopardy as primarily a function of the common law pleas of autrefois
acquit and autrefois convict. 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 213-
14 (1797 ed.). By proving that he had already been acquitted or convicted of the
same offense, a defendant, with some exceptions, could avoid a second trial. United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868,
871 (2d Cir. 1973).
48. "Blackstone . .. used the ancient term 'jeopardy' in characterizing the
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works. Blackstone declared it a "universal maxim of the common
law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his
life more than once for the same offence. ' 49  Different versions of
a double jeopardy clause were considered by Congress5" for inclu-
sion in the Bill of Rights and the language eventually chosen closely
paralleled Blackstone's.
Judge Friendly, after analysis of double jeopardy's history and
incorporation into the fifth amendment, concluded, "[T]he ... choice
of language ... strongly suggests that the Senate intended to ensure
that the Double Jeopardy clause incorporated the protections for
defendants that the common law had come to provide-neither more
nor less." 5' Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Wilson,
reached the same conclusion. Indeed, he went one step further by
isolating the thrust of the common-law protection: "The development
of the Double Jeopardy Clause from its common-law origins thus
suggests that it was directed at the threat of multiple prosecutions, not
at Government appeals, at least where those appeals would not re-
quire a new trial."5
principle underlying the two pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict . . . . 4
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335-36." United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,
340 (1975).
49. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4C 335-36.
50. The adoption proceedings are discussed in United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332, 340-42 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1973),
alf'd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
51. United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1973), a! 'd, 420 U.S.
358 (1975).
52. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342 (1975). The opinions of the
Court in Jenkins and Serfass, written by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger
respectively, did not question Justice Marshall's understanding of the protection
against double jeopardy. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387 (1975);
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975).
The policy of avoiding multiple trials has been regarded as so im-
portant that exceptions to the principle have been only grudgingly allowed.
. . . It was not until 1896 that it was made clear that a defendant could
seek a new trial after conviction ....
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975) (citations omitted).
Justice Story, in United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (No. 15204) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1834), denied a convicted felon the right to seek appellate relief. He believed
that there were no exceptions to the constitutional prohibition of a second trial. The
Court, in United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), retreated from this precedent
and permitted retrial of a defendant who had successfully sought reversal of a convic-
tion.
This exception to the 'one trial' rule has been explained on the conclusory
theories that the defendant waives his double jeopardy claim by appealing
his conviction, or that the first jeopardy continues until he is acquitted or
his conviction becomes final . . . . As Mr. Justice Harlan noted . . . how-
ever, the practical justification for the exception is simply that it is fairer
to both the defendant and the Government.
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343-44 n.1l (1975) (citations omitted).
The importance of the Supreme Court's phrasing of the constitu-
tional protection as a prohibition of a second trial cannot be overem-
plasized. This approach provided guidelines within which each case
of the trilogy was decided and set forth a foundation for future
decisions. Consideration of the three opinions and their application
of the double jeopardy clause to specific fact situations will clarify the
implications of this approach. Before beginning that discussion,
however, a passage from Justice Black's opinion in Green v. United
States53 should be considered. Portions of this passage were quoted
in each of the trilogy decisions:
54
The underlying idea [of the protection against double jeopardy],
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American sys-
tem of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to con-
vict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him
to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty. 55
III. Postverdict Appeals by the Government
A. United States v. Wilson
The first of the double jeopardy trilogy, United States v.
Wilson55 considered the constitutional limitations on prosecution ap-
peals after a jury verdict has been returned. Wilson was indicted
under federal law for conversion of union funds to his personal use.
Claiming that the government had denied him a fair trial by unneces-
sarily delaying his prosecution, Wilson made a pretrial motion for
dismissal. The motion was denied and he was tried and convicted by
a jury. Wilson then moved for a new trial, an arrest of judgment, or a
judgment of acquittal. No ruling was made on these motions; instead
the district court reversed its earlier decision on the pretrial motion
and dismissed the indictment.57 Preindictment delay, which was re-
sponsible for a key witness' inability to testify, was said to have
violated Wilson's fifth amendment right to a fair trial.58
The government sought to appeal the trial court's ruling pur-
suant to the amended Criminal Appeals Act. 9 Asserting lack of
jurisdiction the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to
consider the merits of the appeal.60 The appellate court reasoned
53. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
54. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1975); United States v. Jen-
kins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975).
55. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
56. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
57. The trial judge acted pursuant to FED. R. CRm. P. 48(b).
58. United States v. Wilson, 357 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970).
60. The court of appeals initially dismissed the appeal in a judgment order.
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that the trial court's dismissal was based on facts brought out at trial
and, therefore, was an acquittal barring any appellate review.6 That
the acquittal was rendered after the jury had found Wilson guilty was
held to have no bearing on the issue.
In an opinion written by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded.62 The Justice stated that the double jeop-
ardy clause prevents only multiple punishment and successive prose-
cutions.63 It would not bar appellate review in the instant case
because a successful appeal by the government would not result in a
constitutionally impermissible second trial, but only in reinstatement
of the jury verdict of guilty. Justice Marshall argued,
[I]t is well settled that an appellate court's order reversing
a conviction is subject to further review even when the appellate
court has ordered the indictment dismissed and the defendant
discharged ...
It is difficult to see why the rule should be any different
simply because the defendant has gotten a favorable postverdict
ruling of law from the District Judge rather than from the Court
of Appeals, or because the District Judge has relied to some ex-
tent on evidence presented at trial in making his ruling.
64
In conclusion, Justice Marshall declared that "when a judge rules in
favor of the defendant after a verdict of guilty has been entered by the
trier of fact, the Government may appeal from that ruling without
running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause."6
B. Evaluation of Wilson
Wilson is entirely consistent with the policies underpinning the
On the government's petition for rehearing, the court wrote an opinion setting forth
the reasons for its action. United States v. Wilson, 492 F.2d 1345 (3d Cir. 1973).
61. The court of appeals relied on United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970),
which is discussed at note 40 supra.
62. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
63. Id. at 343.
64. Id. at 345.
65. Id. at 352-53.
Justice Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Brennan. Justice Douglas reasoned,
In the present case, as in Fong Foo, the ruling of the trial court is
based in part on the evidence adduced at trial and in part on other related
issues. Thus the issue of a speedy trial. . . is not reviewable, for it is part
and parcel of the process of weighing the government's evidentiary case
against [Wilson].
Id. at 357. The dissent, however, was not convincing because it relied heavily on
weak precedent, see note 41 and accompanying text supra, and failed to consider the
policies underlying the double jeopardy clause.
Recent applications of Wilson by courts of appeals include United States v.
Burnette, 524 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. DeGarces, 518 F.2d 1156
(2d Cir. 1975); D'Allesandro v. United States, 517 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1975).
double jeopardy clause. 66 No possibility exists that prosecutors will
convert their right to appeal after the return of a guilty verdict into a
weapon for launching successive, harassing, and malicious prosecu-
tions, the evil the clause was designed to prevent.6 7 If the govern-
ment is successful on appeal, the guilty verdict is reinstated and the
prosecution ends. An unsuccessful appeal also terminates the prose-
cution, freeing the defendant from further harassment.
The appeal itself arguably subjects a defendant to the anxiety,
strain, and expense that the double jeopardy clause seeks to eliminate.
The argument, however, ignores many countervailing considerations.
Justice Marshall drew an analogy to the government's well-estab-
lished right to appeal from an appellate reversal of a conviction:"
Although review of any ruling of law discharging a defendant
obviously enhances the likelihood of conviction and subjects him
to continuing expense and anxiety . . . [he] has no legitimate
claim to benefit from an error of law when that error could be
corrected without subjecting him to a second -trial before a sec-
ond trier of fact. 9
When a defendant has no favorable findings of fact to protect, as in
Wilson, the public's interest in justice becomes an overriding con-
cern. 7' A defendant's desire to avoid the increased chance of convic-
tion presented by appeal is reduced to secondary importance by the
jury's unfavorable resolution of the facts. Fairness requires that
some check be placed on the trial judge to assure that he does not
arbitrarily disturb a valid guilty verdict. When a judge overturns a
jury verdict, he probably will be acting to rectify a perceived injustice.
Injustice can be avoided, however, without shielding his unilateral
determination from appellate review. 71
C. Wilson Dicta and Government Appeals from Jury Acquittals
In dicta the Wilson Court briefly considered the merits of a
criminal justice system that would permit appellate review of "all
claimed legal errors."7 This system would allow appeal even from a
jury acquittal. Justice Marshall noted that this approach "has had
66. See notes 52, 55, 63 and accompanying text supra.
67. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); J. SIGLER, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY 156 (1969).
68. See Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 426 (1960).
69. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345 (1975).
70. See Note, Government Appeals of "Dismissals" in Criminal Cases, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1822, 1837-41 (1974).
71. Allowing the government to appeal when the jury has returned a verdict
of guilty enables the trial judge to delay his ruling on a difficult question of law until
defendant has had an opportunity to be acquitted. If the jury acquits, the ruling be-
comes unnecessary. The judge must rule on the motion if the jury convicts, but the
opportunity for appellate review of his decision is preserved and uniform development
of the law is advanced. Comment, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of
Criminal Dismissals, 52 TExAs L. REv. 303, 347-49 (1974).
72. 420 U.S. at 351-52.
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some support among the commentators since Mr. Justice Holmes
adopted it."73  Expanded appellate review would not only promote
symmetry, but also would "avoid the release of some defendants who
have benefited from instructions or evidentiary rulings that are un-
duly favorable to them."74
Any thoughts of approving such a system, however, were quick-
ly extinguished by Justice Marshall: "[MAe have rejected this posi-
tion in the past, and we continue to be of the view that the policies
underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting
the Government to appeal after a verdict of acquittal."7 5 No guilty
verdict would exist to reinstate in the event of a successful appeal. A
second trial violative of the double jeopardy clause would be re-
quired.78 Furthermore, no guarantee exists that an acquittal in a
second trial would be final. Another successful appeal by the gov-
ernment might result in yet a third trial. In the hands of an oppres-
sive government the right of appeal from a jury acquittal could be-
come an extremely potent weapon. No matter how many acquittals
were obtained, a corrupt appellate court could reverse on some man-
ufactured legal ground and send the defendant back to the trial court
to battle once more for his freedom.7 7 The harassment resulting from
abuse of this right of appeal would be severe punishment in itself.
Political enemies and other individuals obnoxious to the government
could be hounded unmercifully. The protection traditionally offered
to a defendant by a jury trial would be effectively circumvented .7
Another consideration is the increased chance of conviction that
would arise under an unrestricted appeal system. 9 After examining
its case's weaknesses and strengthening its presentation, the prosecu-
tion would have an opportunity to persuade a second jury.80 This
73. Id. at 351. Justice Holmes first advocated this approach in his dissent in
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). See note 38 supra. Justice Holmes'
argument is supported by Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE
L.J. 486 (1927).
74. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975).
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. See notes 52, 63 and accompanying text supra.
77. Blackstone urged that after an acquittal is rendered in a jury trial, no biased
court should be permitted to hold otherwise "either by boldly asserting that to be true
which is not so, or by more artfully suppressing some circumstances, stretching and
warping others, and distinguishing away the remainder." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES "379.
78. The jury safeguards the defendant from government oppression and arbi-
trary or biased action by the court. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56
(1968); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 296-97 (1930).
79. Comment, Twice in leopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 278 nn.73-74 (1965).
80. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975).
jury might be more favorably disposed toward the prosecution than
that encountered in the first trial.8'
In practice, it would be difficult for an appellate court to deter-
mine whether legal error or factual innocence caused a jury to ac-
quit .8  Adding to this uncertainty is the traditional freedom of the
jury to reflect the conscience of the community83 and acquit when the
facts and law appear to dictate otherwise.84  In light of the potential
for government abuse and in the interests of finality, 5 defendants
should be protected from appellate review of jury acquittals. Both
the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy and the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial8 6 demand this conclusion.
IV. Applying the Double Jeopardy Clause: Supreme Court
Guidelines
A. United States v. Jenkins
Ronald Jenkins was indicted for failing to report for induction
into the armed services. He waived a jury trial. Following a
bench trial the judge dismissed the indictment,8 7 reasoning that it
would be unfair to apply retroactively a Supreme Court ruling that
local draft boards need not consider post-induction-order claims for
conscientious objector status.s8 An appeal by the United States was
dismissed by the Second Circuit89 for lack of jurisdiction under the
Criminal Appeals Act.90 Although the trial judge had characterized-
his action as a dismissal of the indictment, the court of appeals
believed that Jenkins had been acquitted 9' and that appeal was barred
81. The Supreme Court often has declared that a defendant has a valuable in-
terest in the first jury impaneled. E.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471
(1973). The defendant is deprived of that interest by review of a jury acquittal.
82. The inherent uncertainties could be eliminated through use of the special
verdict. A special verdict consists of the traditional finding of the facts by a jury,
and the application of the law to those facts by the court. Its use in criminal trials,
however, has long been condemned as "another means used by courts to weaken the
constitutional power of juries and to vest judges with more power to decide cases ac-
cording to their own judgments." Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Douglas on the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Proposed Amendments, 31 F.R.D.
617, 618-19 (1963); see Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953); United
States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-83 (1st Cir. 1969).
83. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969).
84. See L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 23:26,
at 37 (1966).
85. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975).
86. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
87. United States v. Jenkins, 349 F. Supp. 1068 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
88. Id. at 1073. The Supreme Court ruling was in Ehlert v. United States, 402
U.S. 99 (1971).
89. United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1973).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970).
91. The court, relying on United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970) (de-
scribed at note 40 supra), emphasized that the trial judge had concluded "that the
statute should not be applied to [Jenkins] as a matter of fact." United States v.
Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 878 (2d Cir. 1973).
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regardless of the need for a second trial. 2
The Supreme Court affirmed,9" but on grounds different from
those propounded by the Second Circuit. Laying a foundation for
the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist summarized the holding in
Wilson: "When a case has been tried to a jury, the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not prohibit an appeal by the Government providing that
a retrial would not be required in the event the Government is
successful in its appeal. 9 4  Since the double jeopardy clause makes
no distinctions between bench and jury trials, its underlying principles
apply to both situations. 5 The Court's inability to discover a clear
resolution of the factual issues against Jenkins in the trial court
compelled a decision in his favor. With no finding of guilt to
reinstate, remand to the trial court for additional findings would have
been required in the event of a successful government appeal.
[I]t is enough for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and
therefore for the determination of appealability under the
[Criminal Appeals Act], that further proceedings of some sort,
devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements
of the offense charged, would have been required upon reversal
and remand.
96
The Court concluded, "The trial, which could have resulted in a
judgment of conviction, has long since terminated in [Jenkins']
favor. To subject him to any further such proceedings at this stage
"97would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
B. Implications of Jenkins
The Court's opinion in Jenkins adds nothing to the fundamental
double jeopardy theory presented in Wilson. Jenkins essentially is an
application of Wilson to a nonjury trial. Present in the Court's
opinion, however, are the seeds of two tests that indicate the manner
in which the Supreme Court intends to apply the protection against
double jeopardy.
92. United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 880 (2d Cir. 1973).
93. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
94. Id. at 365.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 370.
97. Id. Justice Douglas was joined by Justice Brennan in a brief note concur-
ring in the judgment. Id. The note consisted primarily of a citation to Fong Foo v.
United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (described at note 39 supra).
Recent applications of Jenkins by courts of appeals include United States v.
Fayer, 523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Lucido, 517 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.
1975); United States v. Means, 513 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1975).
1. The "Form or Substance" Test.-The most revolutionary
language in Jenkins deals with bench trials, and signals the existence
of a broader appellate review of those trials than is constitutionally
permissible with jury trials.
If the court prepares special findings of fact. . . it may be possi-
ble upon sifting those findings to determine that the court's find-
ing of 'not guilty' is attributable to an erroneous conception of
law whereas the court has resolved against the defendant all of
the factual issues necessary to support a finding of guilt under
the correct legal standard. 98
Only after this sifting to determine if what is in form a finding of
innocence is in substance a finding of guilt will an appellate court be
able to determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
When a trial judge has resolved all factual elements necessary for
guilt against a defendant and applied erroneous law to acquit, the
appellate court can reinstate the "in substance" finding of guilt.99 No
need for a second trial exists, which means that review is authorized
by the Criminal Appeals Act.
This approach is not mere dicta. Justice Rehnquist predicated
the decision in Jenkins on the Court's inability to find that all factual
issues essential to guilt had been resolved against defendant. 1 °
Allowing appeal from a bench trial finding of guilt either in
form or in substance is consistent with the protections afforded by the
double jeopardy clause. The defendant is not threatened with the
harassment of two or more trials. Any favorable resolutions of fact
by the trial judge are accorded the same respect given the findings of
a jury. Only the trial judge's application of the law is questioned."'
A defendant "has no legitimate claim to benefit from an error of law
when that error could be corrected without subjecting him to a second
trial before a second trier of fact.'
0 2
The "guilt in form or in substance" test is an example of a
recurring principle in the trilogy. Merely denominating the action of
a trial judge an acquittal will not automatically cut off appellate re-
view of that action. Chief Justice Burger stated in Serfass that
98. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 367 (1975). FED. R. CRIM. P. 23
(c) reads,
In a case tried without a jury the court shall make a general finding and
shall in addition on request find the facts specially. If an opinion or memo-
randum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact appear
therein.
99. We hold today in Wilson . . .that the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not bar an appeal when errors of law may be corrected and the result of
such correction will simply be a reinstatement of a jury's verdict of guilty
or a judge's finding of guilt.
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 368 (1975).
100. Id. at 367-68.
101. See notes 82-85 and accompanying text supra.





the language of the cases in which we have held there can be no
appeal from . . . an 'acquittal' cannot be divorced from the
procedural context in which the action so characterized was
taken . . The word itself, has no talismanic quality for pur-
poses of ,the Double Jeopardy Clause.
03
The best approach to the word "acquittal" is to ignore it since the
name attached to the trial judge's action has no independent signifi-
cance. What is relevant is whether review of that action will have
consequences offensive to the policies underlying the double jeopardy
clause.'
2. The "Further Proceedings" Test.-Although the Court in-
dicated in Wilson that the prosecution cannot appeal when a success-
ful appeal would necessitate a second trial, it did not expressly define
what constitutes a second trial. The Court's emphasis on having a
guilty finding to reinstate creates an inference that a second trial is a
proceeding in which guilt or innocence is determined. The validity
of this inference was confirmed by Justice Rehnquist in Jenkins:
"[l]t is enough for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause
. . . that further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution
of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged, would
have been required on reversal and remand."' 0 5 Admission or con-
sideration of additional evidence is not necessary for violation of the
double jeopardy clause. On the contrary, the mere making of supple-
mental findings on remand affronts its policies.' 06
Although the "further proceedings" test was applied only to a
bench trial in Jenkins, the test also will apply to jury trials because
"the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . nowhere distinguishes between
bench and jury trials."'1 7 The test's value results from its incorpora-
tion of the basic protections provided by the clause.' 08 In bench
103. 420 U.S. at 392.
104. In Wilson, while rejecting a system allowing appellate review of acquittals,
Justice Marshall did not claim that the double jeopardy clause always bars review of
an "acquittal." He attempted to show that the consequences of review in that case
would be offensive to the policies underlying the double jeopardy clause. 420 U.S.
at 352.
105. 420 U.S. at 370 (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 365.
108. Another desirable aspect of the test is its emphasis on the traditional un-
availability of appellate review of trial court fact finding. Limiting the protections
afforded by the double jeopardy clause to harm caused by the harassment, anxiety,
and expense of a second trial leaves open the question whether a short, simple appel-
late review of trial court fact finding would be barred. This test, however, preserves
the inviolate nature of trial court fact finding. Any review on appeal would in itself
be "further proceedings . . . devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the
elements of the offense charged," and thus barred by the double jeopardy clause.
539
trials the "further proceedings" test simply is another way of applying
the "form or substance" test.' 0 9 The former test assumes an identity
of its own, however, when applied to jury trials" and it is there that
the protections are most evident. A successful appeal from a deter-
mination in defendant's favor occurring prior to the return of a ver-
dict"' clearly would necessitate the type of further proceedings
prohibited by the test. Application of the test in this situation
would bar the appeal." 2
The defendant's freedom seems to have been achieved at the ex-
pense of more important public interests. There is no check on the
trial judge,"' who may set a guilty defendant free by a unilateral
termination of trial on flagrantly erroneous legal grounds. When this
termination occurs shortly after commencement of trial, defendant
avoids suffering even the burdens of a first trial." 4 The defendant,
however, has lost the opportunity to have his fate determined by the
jury first impaneled, a jury that may have been favorably disposed to-
ward his case. The Supreme Court often has recognized that this
interest of a defendant is a "weighty one.""' A corrupt trial judge in
collaboration with the prosecution can easily deprive a defendant of
his interest in having the case tried by the first jury. By dismissing
on invalid legal grounds, the judge could set the stage for an appellate
reversal that would give the prosecution an opportunity to seek a
more favorable jury. The right of appeal also would be vulnerable to
manipulation by an oppressive government. Through a succession of
dismissals and retrials, an innocent individual could be punished"
16
without a jury ever having an opportunity to declare his innocence
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975). This protection is proper
because the government should never be given the opportunity to persuade a second
trier of fact after failing with a first. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,
352 (1975); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662 (1896).
109. If there is an "in substance" trial court finding of guilt to "reinstate" in
the event of a successful government appeal, no remand for "further proceedings"
would be required.
110. The "form or substance" test is inherently limited to bench trials.
111. The proceedings can terminate in a mistrial without the consent of the de-
fendant, United States v. Dinitz, 96 S. Ct. 1075 (1976), prior to the render-
ing of a verdict only when there is "manifest necessity" for such a termination
or when "the ends of public justice" would be defeated by allowing the trial to con-
tinue. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). Justice Rehnquist warned in Jen-
kins, "[Wie think it is of critical importance whether the proceedings in the trial
court terminate in a mistrial . . . or in the defendant's favor, as they did here." 420
U.S. 358, 365 n.7 (1975).
112. See United States v. Lucido, 517 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Means, 513 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1975).
113. Cf. United States v. Means, 513 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1975).
114. This situation occurred in Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962)
(described at note 39 supra). But cf. United States v. Means, 513 F.2d 1329 (8th
Cir. 1975).
115. E.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973).
116. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
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and set him free. 1 7  "It is, after all . . .the chance 'to end the
dispute then and there with an acquittal' that makes the right to a trial
before a particular tribunal of importance to a defendant.""'
Thus, Jenkins provides appellate courts with an easily applied
constitutional test that will simplify the jurisdictional question accom-
panying government appeals. It remains to be seen, however, wheth-
er the Supreme Court will strictly apply the "further proceedings"
test. Justice Rehnquist warned in Illinois v. Somerville that the
Supreme Court has long "eschewed" the use of "rigid, mechanical
rule[s]" in interpreting the double jeopardy clause." 9 The "further
proceedings" test does embody the basic protections provided by the
clause' 20 and it undoubtedly will be the general rule. It would be
unwise, on the other hand, to predict that the test will be applied
without exception, especially in light of the myriad fact situations that




V. Pretrial Terminations and Defense Tactics
A. Serfass v. United States
The third case of the trilogy, Serfass v. United States,122 also
concerned a refusal to submit to induction into the armed services.
After indictment David Serfass pleaded not guilty and demanded a
jury trial. A pretrial motion for dismissal of the indictment was
117. One of the purposes of a jury is to prevent oppression. See Duncan v. Lou-
isiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
118. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 475 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (ci-
tation omitted), quoting from United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971).
119. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 (1973); accord, Serfass v. United
States, 420 U.S. 377, 390 (1975).
120. Cf. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 391 (1975).
121. See notes 139-44 and accompanying text infra; United States v. DiSilvio,
520 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1975). In DiSilvio, the Third Circuit treated a dismissal of
the indictment as a declaration of mistrial and avoided the "further proceedings" test
in determining that the double jeopardy clause would not bar retrial. The dismissal
came at the close of the government's case on defendant's motion. The court rea-
soned, "If retrial was constitutionally proper on the facts of Somerville [410 U.S. 458
(1973)] where the trial court declared a mistrial without defendant's consent, surely
retrial is proper in the instant case where defendant's own motion initiated the dec-
laration of a mistrial." 520 F.2d at 249 n.4. The Supreme Court noted in United
States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470, 478 n.7 (1971), that the "trial judge's characterization
of his own action cannot control the classification of the action for purposes of our
appellate jurisdiction." Widespread adoption of the DiSilvio approach in the courts of
appeals will create a need for Supreme Court definition of when a dismissal is actually
a mistrial to prevent evasion of the "further proceedings" test.
122. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
granted after oral argument. The trial judge concluded that Serfass
was entitled to full consideration of his claim for conscientious objec-
tor status prior to assignment for combat training and that the local
board's reasons for refusing to reopen defendant's file were "suffi-
ciently ambiguous to be reasonably construed as a rejection on the
merits, thereby prejudicing his right to in-service review .... ,,1"'
The United States appealed.' Serfass moved for dismissal of
the appeal, asserting a lack of appellate jurisdiction. Defendant
argued that the trial court ruling was based on facts outside the
indictment that would have constituted a defense on the merits at
trial.125 He contended that this ruling was the "'functional equivalent
of an acquittal on the merits' "and that the appeal was barred by the
double jeopardy clause. 126  The Third Circuit rejected Serfass' con-
tention and ruled that jeopardy had never attached. 27  The court
reversed and remanded on the merits.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in an opin-
ion written by Chief Justice Burger. 28  Analyzing the concept of
attachment of jeopardy, the Court declared,
As an aid to the decision of cases in which the prohibition
of the Double Jeopardy Clause has been invoked, the courts
have found it useful to define a point in criminal proceedings
at which the constitutional purposes and policies are implicated
by resort to the concept of 'attachment of jeopardy' .... In
the case of a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is em-
paneled and sworn . . . . In a nonjury trial, jeopardy attaches
when :the court begins to hear evidence. . . . [J]eopardy does
not attach, and the constitutional prohibition can have no appli-
cation, until a defendant is 'put to trial before the trier of the
facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge."
129
Serfass had not waived his right to a jury trial. 3 ° Thus, the trial
judge did not have power to determine Serfass' factual guilt or
innocence. Jeopardy had not attached, the policies of the double
jeopardy clause were never implicated, and Serfass had no constitu-
tional protection from the government's appeal. "[A]n accused
must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double jeopardy."''3 In
conclusion Chief Justice Burger stated,
123. United States v. Serfass, 492 F.2d 388, 389 (3d Cir. 1974).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970).
125. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 390 (1975).
126. Id. Defendant relied upon United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972),
and United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
127. United States v. Serfass, 492 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1974).
128. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
129. Id. at 388 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Chief Justice Burger as-
serted that the attachment of jeopardy concept was not a "rigid, mechanical rule"
since "the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry
as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial." 420 U.S. at 390, quoting
from Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 (1973).
130. Serfass could not waive his right to a jury trial without the consent of the
United States and approval of the court. FEn. R. CmM. P. 23 (a).




We hold only that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar an
appeal by the United States under [the Criminal Appeals Act]
with respect to a defendant who has not been 'put to trial before
the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.
1 32
B. The Serfass Hypotheticals
Serfass should eliminate a widely held misconception concerning
jury trials. Numerous cases have declared that pretrial terminations
relying on facts outside the indictment are not reviewable when those
facts go to the general issue of guilt.133 Serfass, however, establishes
that any termination prior to jury impanelment is reviewable. 34 The
decision complies with the policies underlying double jeopardy pro-
tection. The prosecution is not given an opportunity to persuade a
second trier of fact after having failed with a first, 13 5 the defendant
has not suffered the rigors of a full trial, 36 and the threat of multiple,
harassing prosecutions is practically nonexistent. A successful gov-
ernment appeal will result only in progress toward commencement of
trial and the eventual attachment of jeopardy. Thereafter, the de-
fendant can invoke the protection of the double jeopardy clause.
It is possible, however, that Serfass will be cited as often for the
questions it explicitly refused to answer as it is for its holding. In the
concluding paragraph of his opinion Chief Justice Burger broached
two hypothetical situations:
[W]e of course express no opinion on the question whether a
similar ruling by ,the District Court after jeopardy had attached
would have been appealable. Nor do we intimate any view con-
cerning the case . . . of 'a defendant who is afforded an oppor-
tunity to obtain a determination of a legal defense prior to trial
and nevertheless knowingly allows himself to be placed in jeop-
ardy before raising the defense."137
132. Id. at 394 (citation omitted). Justice Douglas dissented, "being of the view
that the ruling of the District Court was based on evidence which could constitute
a defense on the merits and therefore caused jeopardy to attach." Id.
Applications of Serfass by courts of appeals include United States v. Pereira, 524
F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Lewis, 519 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Mann, 517 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975).
133. E.g., United States v. Sanford, 503 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated per
curiam, 421 U.S. 996 (1975); United States v. Lewis, 492 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1974),
vacated per curiam, 421 U.S. 943 (1975). United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267
(1970) (described at note 40 supra), is the primary source of this misconception.
134. This applies to terminations denominated acquittals, another example of
that word's lack of sacred qualities. See notes 103-04 and accompanying text supra.
135. 420 U.S. at 391.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 394. See generally FED. R. CiM. P. 12(b)(2).
A successful appeal by the prosecution in either hypothetical would
result in remand to the trial court for a factual determination of guilt
or innocence. 1 8  The appeal, therefore, would be offensive to the
double jeopardy clause under the Jenkins' "further proceedings" test.
Faced with the second hypothetical in an appeal from a jury
trial, the Fifth Circuit reasoned in United States v. Kehoe that
[t]he implication that these might be open issues is important,
because both hypothetical cases seem to fall directly within the
Jenkins rule. . . . Yet the Supreme Court treated the Serfass
hypotheticals as controversies for another day and not cases
clearly controlled by Jenkins. Consequently, it seems likely that
the Court intended Jenkins to be limited to its facts: a bench
trial terminated by a ruling that-since it may have been one
in fact-must be treated as an acquittal for purposes of the
double jeopardy clause. Thus, none of the recent Supreme
Court cases controls here.13
9
Counsel for defendants stated at oral argument "that he waited to
make his 'motion for acquittal' because he wanted an opportunity to
view the government's evidence. ' 140  To foil defendants' tactics the
Fifth Circuit felt it necessary to limit Jenkins. The court employed a
balancing of interests' that resulted in a determination that a second
trial would not be prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.' 42
The Kehoe rationale notwithstanding, the Supreme Court did
not intend Jenkins to be limited in the manner chosen by the Fifth
Circuit. Chief Justice Burger probably meant that none of the trilogy
cases factually resolved the hypotheticals, rather than that the trilogy
provided no guidance. Although the "further proceedings" test
should not be applied as a rigid, mechanical rule,'43 the policies
enunciated in Wilson, Jenkins, and Serfass require that with few
exceptions appeals from a preverdict termination in defendant's favor
be barred."'
Despite the unjustified limitation of Jenkins in Kehoe, the result
138. Chief Justice Burger did not expressly limit the hypotheticals to either a
jury or bench trial situation. Serfass itself had arisen in a pre-jury trial context.
139. 516 F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 1103-04 (1976).
140. id. at 86. The motion for acquittal correctly asserted that the indictment
failed to charge an offense against the United States. Id. at 81.
141. Id. at 85-86. The Supreme Court applied an identical test in ruling on the
validity of a mistrial in Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
142. 516 F.2d at 96.
143. See notes 119-21 and accompanying text supra.
144. The Eighth Circuit was confronted in United States v. Means, 513 F.2d
1329 (8th Cir. 1975), with the first Serfass hypothetical. On the basis of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct, the trial had been terminated in defendants' favor while the
jury was engaged in deliberation. The court of appeals stated,
Although our precise question was not answered by the Supreme Court in
its recent trilogy, the policies expressed in those opinions require our con-
clusion that a government appeal in this case would violate the Double




was just. Allowing defendants to delay motions until jeopardy has
attached to avoid appellate review offends the public sense of justice.
This is a manipulation, not an invocation, of the double jeopardy
clause. Recognizing that "the trial judge's characterization of his
own action cannot control the classification of the action for purposes
of . . . appellate jurisdiction,"' 45 the Fifth Circuit analogized the
case before them to a mistrial. The court then weighed defendants'
interests against the public's interest in justice.'46 Logically tipping
the scales was defendants' motion for acquittal, by which they re-
nounced their interest in the first jury.
The Fifth Circuit's approach places too much emphasis, how-
ever, on an ad hoc balancing of interests by an appellate court. 4 7 A
better way to reach the same decision exists. Chief Justice Burger
explained in Serfass that jeopardy attaches at the "point in criminal
proceedings at which the constitutional purposes and policies [of the
double jeopardy clause] are implicated."'14 8 In Kehoe those policies
were never implicated. Double jeopardy protection assumes that
defendants do not come willingly to trial; the anxiety, embarrasment,
and expense will be avoided if possible. Defendants in Kehoe, on the
other hand, willingly submitted to trial. They had no interest in the
first jury since the proceedings were to be aborted before the jury had
an opportunity to acquit. Thus, jeopardy never attached and a
second trial was not barred. "[A]n accused must suffer jeopardy
before he can suffer double jeopardy."' 49
145. 516 F.2d at 82, quoting from United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 478 n.7
(1971).
146. 516 F.2d at 85-86.
147. The balancing is needlessly subject to individual prejudices, values, and mo-
tives of appellate judges and to manipulation by an oppressive government. Justice
Rehnquist expressly noted the Court's disagreement with the "balancing of interests"
analysis applied to Jenkins by a dissenting judge in the Second Circuit: "We disagree
with this analysis because we think it is of critical importance whether the proceed-
ings in the trial court terminate in a mistrial . . . .or in the defendant's favor, as
they did here." United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 n.7 (1975). Rehnquist,
however, may have been alluding to the possibility that the termination in Jenkins
had a factual basis. If so, a majority of the present Court believes that double
jeopardy is not a bar to a second trial following a mistrial or dismissal that occurs
after the attachment of jeopardy and at the request or with the consent of defendant-
provided the termination clearly involves no factual determination and defendant is
unable to show bad faith on the part of the trial judge or prosecution. See United
States v. Dinitz, 96 S. Ct. 1075 (1976).
148. 420 U.S. at 388.
149. Id. at 393. Jeopardy would have attached if the defendants' motion for dis-
missal had been denied. From that moment they no longer would be submitting will-
ingly to trial. The suggested approach relies heavily on proof of an actual intent
to delay the motion for dismissal. In the absence of such an intent, appellate review
should be denied on double jeopardy grounds.
VI. Conclusion
Wilson, Jenkins, and Serfass were forthright statements of the
Court. The double jeopardy trilogy, as a result, accomplished much
of the task of defining the breadth of government appeal rights in
criminal cases:
1. Whether it be a jury or bench trial, the prosecution can ap-
peal from a termination in favor of the defendant when a
finding of guilt that can be reinstated exists.
2. Appeal is barred from jury acquittals and determinations of
factual innocence by a trial judge.
3. All terminations in favor of the defendant that occur prior
to impanelment of the jury or before the court begins to hear
evidence in a bench trial are subject to appellate review.
The Court's opinion in each case reflected the views of at least
seven Justices. Near unanimity in cases dealing with a concept as
vague as double jeopardy protection, however, indicates that the
Court was not addressing the more difficult problems that arise in
applying the double jeopardy clause to government appeal rights.
No simple rule can be promulgated to answer the multitude of
questions present when a trial is terminated prior to a factual de-
termination of guilt or innocence. Although the "further proceed-
ings" test was introduced as a general approach to these termina-
tions, the Court also reaffirmed its antipathy to the use of rigid, me-
chanical rules and its emphasis on promoting the policies underlying
the double jeopardy clause. The proper blend of these considerations
places a heavy burden on the prosecution to justify an appeal that,
if successful, will result in remand to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings.
The broad discretion given a trial judge can be exercised wisely
only after full consideration of the consequences his action will have
on the availability of appellate review. For example, delaying a
ruling on a midtrial motion until the jury has returned a verdict can
preserve review of a difficult question of law. Likewise, careful
recording of bench trial fact findings can protect appellate review, as
can efforts to dispose of motions before jeopardy attaches. Thus, by
identifying trial terminations from which an appeal by the prosecu-
tion is clearly permissible, the Supreme Court has created an opportu-
nity for immediate improvement in the administration of justice in the
United States. Widespread consideration of Wilson, Jenkins, and
Serfass in the trial courts will eliminate waste and injustice that result
from termination of trials by unreviewable rulings founded on mis-
conceptions of law.
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